Introduction
There is a longstanding tradition of analyzing trade and growth in economics, going back to the discipline's founders. But for Latin America, the debate on the significance of this relationship has had much more than academic relevance. It has been one of the central components of the different approaches to development that have shaped the region's economic history, the other (closely related) component being the roles of the State and of the market in economic development.
In Latin America, the dominant understanding of the relationship between trade and growth has evolved radically over time. Starting from the position that foreign trade should be managed with the objective of promoting industrialization and domestic development, around the mid 1980s it changed to an opposing view based on the notion that free trade and privatization are the fundamental guarantors of sustainable economic growth. In the last ten years, however, the consensus view has shifted again, to a more critical, skeptical view of the benefits of trade as an automatic and dynamic engine of economic growth.
More precisely, analysis of the trade-growth relationship in Latin America since World War II has passed through various stages. The first, which lasted until the early 1960s, was associated with the dominance of the Structuralist school of economic thought. It was marked by a rejection of free trade policies, an emphasis on primary commodity exports and inward, state-led industrialization. In the second stage, which lasted from 1960 to the mid-70's, the policies associated with 'structuralism' were called into question. But many professional economists remained committed to state led industrialization while also recognizing the role of manufacturing exports in promoting growth. The third and fourth stages were characterized by the dominance of orthodox economists and the 6 unconditional support within the economics profession for free trade and free market policies. Finally the fifth stage, associated with the erosion of the Washington Consensus, reflects the end of the region's fascination with free trade as an unequivocal and strong promoter of development. It has its roots, on the one hand, in Latin America's failed quest to enter a path of high and sustained economic expansion after the drastic elimination of trade protection implemented across the continent since the mid 1980s. On the other hand, it is also rooted in the fact that the resumption of high rates of economic expansion in many countries of the region in the last five years has resulted mainly from the worldwide commodity and mineral boom -a boom whose cause and effects have nothing to do with the adoption of the trade liberalization reforms in the region.
The approaches to the relationship between trade and growth described above were embedded in particular rhetorics meant to persuade and win converts to their causes 1 . The terms 'center-periphery', "dependency", 'external strangulation' and 'secular decline in the terms-of-trade' were introduced and became integral parts of the development literature in the region during the inward industrialization stage. The expressions 'import-substitution industrialization' (ISI), 'export oriented industrialization' (EOI) and 'rent-seeking behavior' were widely used thereafter, especially in the third stage. As we will see, in spite of their theoretical difference, the rhetoric of the alternative approaches to trade and growth that have prevailed in Latin America shared a common feature. Each emphasized the allegedly dynamic, growth oriented character of their own interpretation of the determinants of growth and underscored their close correspondence to the Latin American reality. Opposing theoretical perspectives and their implicit economic policies were portrayed as flawed, based on an incorrect or unrealistic identification of the determinants of growth, and even as inapplicable to the Latin American case. This paper analyses the different approaches to trade and growth in Latin America from the end of WWII to the present day. Specifically, it examines the underlying rhetoric of these alternative approaches and the extent to which their rhetorics matched their understanding of Latin American reality. It is shown that throughout the period under study, the relationship between trade and growth was far from robust. In other words, the region has been unable to make exports the lynchpin of rapid long-run growth. Addressing this failure is one of the most urgent tasks confronting Latin America, and one which has received insufficient attention.
I. The Latin American rhetoric on trade and growth: part I
At the time of the initial formulation of development as an economic discipline following WWII, the prevailing theory of international commerce advocated unrestricted trade on the grounds that it is a mutually beneficial activity for both rich and poor nations. Using as its centre-piece the doctrine of comparative advantage developed by David Ricardo, the theory asserted that free trade enables trading countries to specialize in the production of the commodities they are able to produce at home at the lowest real cost, in accordance to their factor endowments. Free trade thus facilitates the optimal use of resources. These benefits were compounded by the freedom of choice in consumption allowed for by free trade 2 .
The argument for free trade was very persuasive. It showed that any country -independently of its relative endowment of resources and its productive structure would benefit from free trade. The free trade doctrine was part of the general argument for laissez-faire which was lauded for its 2 See Allen (1958) for an exposition and defence of free trade theory and policy. The properties of the standard mainstream free trade model based on comparative advantage the Hecksher-Ohlin (H-O) or Hecksher-Ohlin-Samualeson (H-O-S) model are found in four well-known theorems: (i) the Hecksher-Ohlin theorem; (ii) the Stolper-Samuelson theorem ;(iii) the Rybczynski theorem; and (iv) the factor-price equalisation theorem. The Hecksher-Ohlin theorem establishes a relationship between factor scarcity and factor embodiment in a commodity, such that countries export the commodity that intensively uses the abundant factor. It provides the basis for the gains from trade argument. These refer to the increase in output and real income for a given set of inputs or domestic resources that result from trade. The Stolper-Samuelson theorem complements the above theorem by stating that the intensive use of a factor of production for export (i.e., the abundant factor) raises its rate of return above all other prices. In turn, the consequent increase in the supply of that factor of production will lead to an increase in the output of the commodity intensive in that factor of production (the Rybczynski theorem). Finally, the factor price-equalisation theorem states that trade equalises commodity and factor prices across countries. Under conditions of perfect competition, trade in goods acts as a substitute for factor mobility. Under conditions of imperfect competition, free trade does not result in the full equalization of commodity and factor prices. However, free trade reduces commodity and factor price differentials among countries and thus acts as a force of convergence. See Evans (1989) .
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Trade and economic growth: A Latin American perspective… 8 65 promotion of both economic efficiency and social equity. The latter was a crucial component of laissez faire and free trade rhetoric. As asserted by Viner (1960, p. 66; p. 68) : "no modern people will have zeal for the free market unless it operates within a setting of 'distributive justice' with which they are tolerably content" 3 .
The analytical argument for free trade required very stringent assumptions. It assumed market clearing in the labor market (full employment), and that all trading nations have equal access to the same technology and to all markets 4 . The majority of development economists dealing with the Latin American case, including Raúl Prebisch (1901 , Ragnar Nurske (1907 -1959 , Arthur C. Lewis (1915 -1991 ), Gunnar Myrdal (1898 and Paul Rosenstein-Rodan (1902 -1985 , adopted an opposite view. They maintained that the expansion of trade hindered economic growth and development. Their arguments were prefaced on the fact that the assumptions required by the argument for free trade theory were not applicable to developing countries. For this opposing perspective, the fact that developed and developing countries did not have access to the same technology and that there were no mechanisms to ensure that all countries could equally share the fruits of technological progress constituted the basis on which to question the mainstream view of the trade-growth-development nexus.
The above-named economists identified several mechanisms through which trade generated and compounded international inequality. Such mechanisms included (among others) the combination of inelastic world demand for primary products, the existing mix of monopolistic markets for manufactures and competitive markets for primary products, and the enclave nature of primary commodity production.
The view that trade could be a fetter to economic growth justified the implementation of state led inward industrialization and development policies. From the mid-1940s until the 1960s, excluding trade as an automatic engine for growth meant that the problem of industrialization and development had to be understood as crucially dependent on achieving a sufficient rate of capital accumulation 5 . The process of capital accumulation would lead to development by the absorption of excess labor into the more productive sectors and by raising overall productivity (Lewis 1942 , Rosenstein-Rodan, 1943 . Also, a rapid process of capital accumulation would allow the populations of developing countries to break away from the 'vicious circle of poverty' or the 'poverty trap' (Nurske, 1952; Nelson, 1956 ).
This alternative theoretical framework implied on the one hand that development could not be attained unless a significant effort was made to accumulate capital. On the other hand this framework presupposed that the existing 'automatic market forces' would keep the economic system entrenched in a low level of development. Industrialization was not to be left to the market, but was rather to be the product of government intervention 6 . In fact, the state was called on to take a leading role in the inward industrialization process.
3
As put by Speigel (1987, p. 814) "The article in which Viner developed these ideas was ostensibly an exposition of the rhetoric of laissez faire, an early exercise in an approach that D.N. McCloskey was to apply on a wider scale more than a quarter century later." 4 See Eatwell (1987), Robinson (1979, pp. 102-104) .
5
The identification of development with economic growth and industrialization was entrenched in the thought of early development theorists. In this regard, it is interesting to note that Arthur Lewis' The Theory of Economic Growth -first published in 1955-dealt with development issues and not with what economists currently understand as "growth theory." 6 See Nurske, (1953 ), p. 10. Meier (2005 ), pp. 61-67 and Arndt (1987 In the specific case of Latin America, the case for inward state led industrialization found its most complete formulation in Prebisch (1949 Prebisch ( , 1951 Prebisch ( and 1959 . It rested mainly on a division between the structure and function of countries in the center (developed) and those in the periphery (developing). The former are self sustained in their technological progress which is the dynamic force in the growth process. The countries of the periphery supply food and raw materials to the countries of the center but do not manage to equally benefit from the fruits of the technological progress achieved at the center. In fact, the benefits of increased productivity in the periphery are transferred to the center. Countries in the periphery are thus caught in a poverty trap. The suggested solution was inward state-led industrialization. As Prebisch (1984, p. 179) argued: "…import substitution stimulated by a moderate and selective protection policy was an economically sound way to achieve certain desirable effects. Such a policy would help correct the tendency toward a foreign constraint on development resulting from the low income elasticity of demand for imports of primary product by the centers, compared with the high income elasticity of demand at the periphery for manufactures from the centers. Import substitution by protection counteracts the tendency toward the deterioration in the terms of trade by avoiding the allocation of additional productive resources to primary export activities and diverting them instead to industrial production. Industrialization, in addition to assisting the overall penetration of technology and creating employment, promotes changes in the structure of production in response to this high demand elasticity for manufactures… industrialization and increased productivity in primary production are complementary. The more intense the latter, the greater the need for industrialization."
The existing complementarities between primary production and industrialization meant that the manufacturing sector could not develop at the expense of agriculture. It also implied that state-led industrialization required the expansion of primary exports. Exports of primary products were to be encouraged as they provided the finance to buy imported capital goods -machinery and equipment-at this stage indispensable to sustain the industrialization effort 8 .
These arguments and theoretical constructs and their associated rhetoric did not in fact induce the adoption of import substitution policies by Latin America countries. Rather the opposite was the case. That is, the adoption of import substitution policies preceded the formulation of the approach associated with import substitution and its rhetoric. As stated by Prebisch (1984, p. 177): "In reality my policy proposal provided a theoretical justification for the industrialization process which was already being followed (especially by the large countries of Latin America), to encourage others to follow it too, and to provide all of them with an orderly strategy for carrying this out."
In short, state led industrialization was a fact before it became a policy and a policy before it became a theory 9 . Moreover, the political discourse that advocated this policy was dominated by the belief that industrialization, much more than a coherent set of economic measures with the aim of boosting growth and employment, was the way to overcome economic "backwardness"
10
. In short, inward state led industrialization policies were not derived from a theory and were not part of a standard economic strategy adopted by all or most Latin American economies. Rather they were a practical reality in the large economies of the region (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Venezuela). In 1950, Raul Prebisch was appointed Executive Secretary of the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA, later renamed as ECLAC to officially include the Caribbean in its denomination). However, some of the main concepts that became associated with ECLAC, such as the 'center-periphery' dichotomy or the 'secular decline in the terms-of-trade', were developed in the mid1940s. It is to be noted that ECLA was created in 1948 and the outcome of its first meeting was a resolution requesting a study of Latin America's terms-of-trade. See Love (2005), pp. 162-163. 8 See, Prebisch (1949), 2 and Frankenhoff (1962), p. 192. 9 Love, 1994, p. 395 cited in J. A. Ocampo (2004) . In the nations that adopted this development strategy the state used a variety of instruments to promote industrialization, including its legal authority to control the major natural resource based industries (i.e. the 'crown jewels'). It undertook the promotion of new industries through fiscal, monetary and commercial means. Such instruments included a variety of subsidies ranging from fiscal transfers and tax exemptions, and also the use of selective tariff policy which aimed to increase effective protection. Most important, the state established national or development banks to channel credit under favorable circumstances -including below market and/or fixed nominal rates of interest-to targeted sectors 11 .
11
Brazil provides one of the best examples of formal, organized government intervention in the economy. It adopted the first formal government development plan in Latin America, the Target Plan of 1956-1960. Chile's guided industrialization efforts by the Corporación de Fomento (CORFO) is another case in point. CORFO was created in 1939 to take a leading role in the establishment of several manufacturing industries and the diversification of the productive structure (Collier and Satin, 1996, pp. 235-37) . This interventionist view was, in general, widespread in the region at the time, and also accepted internationally. Hence the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) included provisions allowing countries to impose tariff protection and import restrictions in order to safeguard their balance of payments position (articles 12 and 18) -see WTO (1999) and Meier (2005, pp. 74-75 ) -while not imposing specific trade rules on government procurement nor prohibiting subsidies of services.
II. The Latin American rhetoric on trade and growth: part II
The inward oriented development strategy evolved into one that recognized the role played by the external sector in promoting growth. This change in orientation was due in part to the perception that the strategy of inward industrialization did not provide the required foreign exchange, and that developing countries faced an impending foreign exchange gap. At the more general level, this change in orientation responded to the limitations of the inward industrialization process 12 . The strategy gradually reached a point where it was unable to significantly develop the manufacturing industry and thus improve the growth prospects of Latin American economies (see tables 1 and 2 below). Between 1941 Between -1949 Between and 1950 Between -1959 , the average growth rate for Latin America declined from 2.7% to 1.7%. At the same time the composition of Latin American GDP did not alter greatly. The share of most industries in economic activity (mining, transportation and communication, electricity, gas and water, and services) remained essentially unchanged, although between 1950 and 1960 the share of manufacturing increased slightly from 19% to 22% of GDP while that of agriculture declined from 25% to 22%. In terms of the distribution of the labor force, manufacturing maintained its share between 1950 and 1960, while that of agriculture fell from 54% to 48%.
12
See Arndt (1989) , p. 76, who also states that the "Soviet efforts to neutralise the role of GATT, reinforced by the emerging political muscle of the Third World' was also a factor that influenced this change of orientation. Source: United Nations (1966); Grunwald (1970) .
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The contribution of the inward industrialization process to growth and development during this period was hampered by several factors. Tax and investment incentives were provided to foreign firms, but these firms contributed little by way of value added and employment to the economies in which they operated and had rather regressive effects on the distribution of income. Moreover the strategy failed to create a robust domestic capital goods industry. As such, developing economies never really broke their dependency on imports of foreign machinery, equipment and intermediate goods. Finally, the repatriation of profits by foreign firms and the substantial import requirements of domestically-produced consumer goods compounded the balance of payments constraint 13 .
In Latin America, the limitations of this "closed economy" development strategy were soon recognized. In the late 1950s, the initial concern was the growing import requirement of capital and intermediate goods, which exceeded the capacity of exports thus creating a "foreign exchange gap". ECLA economists understood that to avoid what they termed the 'external strangulation' of Latin American economies, the persistent rise in net-imports of capital goods had to be offset by large volumes of financial flows, be it foreign investment or external debt.
During the 1960's, criticisms of the inward industrialization strategy became more general. It was argued that the strategy: i) was not conducive to the development of manufacturing (ECLA, 1964) , ii) had failed to weaken the import requirements of capital and intermediate goods (Tavares, 1964) , iii) had failed to generate sufficient employment and iv) had created inefficient industries incapable of competing in the international markets (Macario, 1964) 14 . Such recognition of the limits of the inward industrialization strategy opened the way for a shift towards a new "growth through trade" strategy. This shift was reinforced by the growing importance granted to trade by multilateral organizations, as reflected in the adoption in 1961 of resolution 1707, 'International Trade as the Primary Instrument for Development' by the UN General Assembly. In this regard, the creation of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the nomination of Raúl Prebisch as its first Director General provided a unique opportunity to articulate the new development strategy.
Prebisch criticized the strategy of industrialization, arguing that it was bringing about the creation of inefficient industries, leading Latin America to adopt on average the highest tariffs in the world, preventing the generation of economies of scale and thus hindering overall growth prospects 15 . In his words, it had:
"generally insulated national markets from external competition, weakening and even destroying the incentive necessary for improving the quality of output and lowering costs under the private-enterprise system. It has thus tended to stifle the initiative of enterprises as regards both the internal and external market exports" 16 .
The revised strategy was formulated by UNCTAD for the developing world as a whole 17 . However, it reflected foremost the evolution of Latin American thinking on the relationship between trade and growth. As noted by Love (2005) , p. 170-171: "The original UNCTAD programme…was that of ECLA mutatis mutandis at the global level. Prebisch's reports to the organization in 1964 and 1968 if not fully "cepalismo", were definitely international adaptations of the regional agency as it had evolved by the early 1960s"
18 . From this new perspective exports of primary commodities were seen as necessary to finance imports. It also stressed the need for developing countries to export manufactured products. In
The over valued currencies in many countries which adopted this strategy further stimulated imports and deterred exports, thus weakening their trade balance positions.
14 Prebisch (1986) pp. 212-213 asserts that the criticism of import substitution can be dated at least to 1959, but is careful to state that the first severe critique of the industrialization policy followed in Latin America was put forward in 1961 in his document "Economic Development, Planning and International Cooperation." 15 Prebisch (1986) states: "In ECLAC we maintained from the very outset that protection was indispensable as a means of standing up to the centres' technical and economic superiority. Unfortunately protection as a general rule has been greatly exaggerated if not abusive and has been kept in force for a very long time, affording industries no incentive to reduce their production costs…." See, Prebisch (1967) and Love (2005, pp. 170-173) . 16 See, Prebisch (1984) and . 17 See, UNCTAD (1964) .
18
See also, Prebisch (1964 and 1967) .
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Trade and economic growth: A Latin American perspective… 14 the case of Latin America, manufactured export products accounted for only 4% of total exports in 1961-62 (see table 3 below). Moreover, it also argued that non-reciprocal treatment should be granted by developed to developing countries to "promote specialization in industrial and primary commodities." Such treatment was justified on the basis of the infant industry argument. Trade -and more specifically managed trade-was considered a 'primary instrument for growth.' Within this strategy the government had a key role to play in the management of trade, by implementing selected measures to monitor the evolution of imports and promoting exports.
TABLE 3 COMPOSITION OF EXPORTS OF LATIN AMERICA, 1934-1962
(Percentages) 1934-1938 1946-1951 1955-1956 1961-1962 Agricultural 
III. The Latin American rhetoric on trade and growth: part III
The Latin American rhetoric on trade changed remarkably from the 1980s onwards. The main event behind this shift was the international debt crisis that plunged the whole region into a deep financial collapse. Indeed, following the onset of the crisis in 1980, Latin American GDP per capita growth contracted in 1981, 1982 and 1983 by 1.8%, 3.6% and 4.7% respectively (see figure 1) . The varying intensity of the debt crisis within Latin America produced large disparities of GDP per capita variation at the country level. In 1981, eight out of eighteen Latin American countries suffered contractions, including three of the largest economies of the region: Argentina, Brazil and Venezuela (where GDP fell 7.1%, 6.6% and 3.4% respectively). In 1982, all of Latin American economies, with the exception of Panama, experienced contraction. In 1983, the region contracted once again with the exceptions of Argentina and three Central American countries (Costa Rica, El Salvador and Nicaragua). In spite of the slow recovery process which began in 1984, these three consecutive years of massive downturns produced the worst decadal growth performance in Latin America and the 1980's were termed the 'Lost Decade' (see figure 1 ).
The 'Lost Decade' and the codification of free market oriented policies into the so called Washington Consensus became the main pillars on which to launch a devastating critique of the developmental policies 1963 1965 1967 1969 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 Cycle GDP Trend Source: Authors´ calculations based on data from World Bank Development Indicators (2009).
The policies followed prior to the 1980s were all classified under the label of import substitution industrialization (ISI). This label permeated the development vocabulary, and was interpreted (or caricaturized) as an autarkic strategy seeking to substitute domestic goods for imports through a plethora of price distorting incentives, in particular in the area of trade policy. A recent textbook description is provided in Dunn and Mutti (2000 , p. 264-265): "During 1950 -1970 , the governments of many developing countries encouraged by a few academic economists, concluded that international trade was unlikely to benefit poor countries and that they should design policies to minimize their reliance on trade. Instead of stressing export growth, tariffs and other trade barriers were used to encourage the growth of local industries in order to produce substitutes for products that had previously been imported. This inward-looking, or autarkic, approach was designed to sharply reduce the role of trade in a nation's economy….the export sector could be ignored or even taxed, a strategy that promoted the shift of resources out of primary production" 20 .
Mainstream economists and orthodox policy makers consider ISI as having had only detrimental consequences for growth. They argue that ISI is at the root of many of the ills of developing economies 19 See Rodrik (2006) . The original Washington Consensus consisted of ten reform policies: (1) fiscal discipline; 2) reorientation of public expenditure; 3) tax reform; 4) liberalization of financial markets; 5) competitive exchange rate; 6) liberalization of trade policies; 7) openness to foreign direct investment; 8) privatization; 9) deregulation and 10) secure property rights. See Williamson (1990) .
20
A similar interpretation can be found in the case of Latin America in the study undertaken by El Colegio de México, the Fundacao Getulio Vargas and the Washington Institute for International Economics published in the early 1980s. The study asserts: "The early post-war years saw a policy shift from export orientation to import substitution in Latin America. The intellectual underpinnings of this shift were provided by the United Commission for Latin America that saw scant possibilities for export growth through export expansion. The view was expressed that, due to a secular decline in their import coefficients, the developed industrial countries would not provide a sufficient stimulus for economic growth through primary exports; that Latin American countries were not in a favourable position to develop manufactured exports…". Prebisch terms this view "a purely arbitrary assertion". See, Prebisch (1986), p. 212. including: the decline of primary sector output and exports; the excessive promotion of capital-intensive techniques coupled with low capacity utilization and high levels of unemployment and informality; unequal distribution of incomes and high poverty rates 21 .
The intellectual origins of such anti-ISI rhetoric can be traced back to a series of empirical studies aimed at measuring the effects of the distortions brought about by trade protection. Perhaps the most influential one in this regard was Little, Scitovsky, and Scott (1970) . The book argued that countries that pursued import substitution policies beyond certain limits suffered adverse impacts. Import substitution led to an inefficient and high cost industrial sector incapable of facing foreign competition, and that could only survive by absorbing resources from other sectors, inter alia agriculture. They stressed that the administrative controls necessary to keep in place this 'distorted' incentive structure led firms to operate below potential capacity and thus to generate unemployment.
A key empirical measure of the distortion introduced by ISI policies presented by these and subsequent authors is the rate of effective protection 22 . This measures "the percentage by which the value added at a particular stage of processing in a domestic industry can exceed what it would be without protection" 23 . The greater the effective rate of protection the greater the level of distortion introduced by a given tariff regime. Their empirical studies concluded that the rates of effective protection in Latin America were high and that they exhibited great variance by type of good, among economic sectors and even within countries (see tables 4 and 5 below). As an example, the average rate of effective protection in Brazil in the year 1966 ranged from 31% in capital goods industries to 230% in the consumption goods industries. But in Mexico, the rate of effective protection was much lower and the dispersion narrower, varying from 22% in the consumption goods industries to 55% in capital goods industries. Moreover, while Brazil afforded the highest rate of protection to consumption goods, Mexico provided it to its capital goods industries (see table 4). See for example, Griffin (1989) pp. 109-111 and Todaro (1989), pp. 438-444. 22 The studies by Little, Scitovsky and Scott, Ibid, and Balassa and Associates (1971) are the most cited computations of effective rates of protection. Others include, Cohen (1971) ; Anjaria (1987) ; World Bank (1987) and Greenway and Milnar (1987) .
23
The effective rate of protection is formally defined in the most simple terms as: The argument based on the concept of effective protection turned out to be weak. First, as shown in Table 5 , estimates of effective protection rates exhibited a wide range of variation. While Little et al. (1970) calculated a rate of 162% for Argentina for the manufacturing sector, Cohen (1971) computed a rate of just 55%. These computations also required stringent assumptions that call into question their veracity. Most important, empirical studies that followed the pioneering study by Little et. al (1970) showed that the role of the rate of effective protection in obstructing export development, industrialization and growth was in fact ambiguous. As explained by Brutton (1998) p. 912: "A particularly interesting point about the ERP [effective rate of protection] as it evolved is that a number of countries, later achieving outstanding success, showed the same sort of protection picture as did later failures. An obvious example is Taiwan….Taiwan's ERP for consumer goods was higher than that of the Philippines and vastly higher than that of Mexico…Evidently the role of ERP is still ambiguous" This initial ISI criticism based on empirical measures such as the rate of effective protection was surpassed by an argument that emphasized the inefficient and rent-seeking character of government and government officials. Rent-seeking was highlighted as a wasteful, inefficient and costly activity inherent to any regime based on strong intervention of the State in the economy. This criticism -based on the New Political Economy (NPE)-argued for a minimalist state as its proponents argued that governments were "almost universally prone to failure" 24 .
The argument was potent because it stated that the most serious detrimental consequence of ISI for growth and development stemmed not from the distortion of resource allocation and its effects on output. Rather, the most important consequence was that it led to rent seeking, thus destroying the very foundations for growth and development. Indeed, ISI was seen as merely transforming the main agents 24 The expression is from Stewart (2005) .
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of production and growth, namely firms and entrepreneurs, into rent-seeking entities. The argument was already present in Little et al: "The most serious results of these policies, however, is that the nascent industries have come to depend for their profits on government decisions, and so have formed the habit of devoting their efforts to obtaining privileges by pressure on the government rather than by cutting their costs" 25 . Nonetheless, the NPE rent-seeking ISI argument was developed to its full extent during the 1980s drawing on the work of Buchanan and Tullock (1962) 26 . Either forced by necessity or convinced by the weight of argument, most Latin American economies adopted trade liberalization policies in the late 1980s and 1990s. In a sense, the free trade discourse and associated rhetoric represented a return to the arguments traditionally espoused in favor of such policies. First, that free trade improves resource allocation and stimulates employment and growth. Second, free trade is fair trade as it provides equal trading opportunity to all countries according to their respective capacities and endowments. Third, free trade helps countries to achieve development, 25 Little et al. ibid., p. xviii. 26 Representatives of the New Political Economy include Lal (1982) and Bhagwati (1982) . . The openness coefficient, measured as the sum of export and imports over GDP, almost doubled, increasing from 23% to 40% between the periods 1970-1980 and 2002-2006 (see tables 6 and 7 above and below). The Latin American stance on free trade was enhanced by the region's active participation in promoting the Free Trade Area of the Americas 29 , and more importantly in the region´s involvement in the proliferation in bilateral free trade agreements (BFTA). The number of BFTAs -just four prior to the North American Free Trade Agreement signed by Mexico, the US and Canada in 1994 -increased thereafter to more than twenty (see table 8 It should be noted that the nominal tariff estimates presented in table 6 do not include para-tariffs. The inclusion of para-tariffs increases the rate of nominal protection. Edwards (1995, p. 200) reports for example that the pre-tariff rate of protection including para-tariffs was 92% for Costa Rica and 80% for Brazil, whereas in table 6, the nominal level of protection is 53% and 51%, respectively.
Estudios y perspectivas -Mexico -N o 119 Trade and economic growth: A Latin American
29
The Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA, hereafter) negotiations which were expected to be completed in the year 2005 involved 34 countries including all Latin American and Caribbean countries, the United States and Canada -countries with important differences in size, population, economic structure, economic performance and, stability and welfare. The FTAA comprised nine negotiating groups. These are, market access, agriculture, government procurement, investment, competition policy, intellectual property rights, services, dispute settlement, subsidies, antidumping and countervailing duties. FTAA was negotiated on the belief that a free trade agreement will i) widen and solidify market access leading countries to maintain their preferential market access and act as a springboard for export development and promotion; ii) lead to greater foreign direct investment; iii) allow for technological transfer; and iv) improve labor mobility. See Roberts (2008) for a proposal to rethink and resuscitate the now-defunct FTAA.
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IV. The Latin American rhetoric on trade and growth: part IV
The proliferation of BFTAs have without doubt deepened Latin America's free market orientation by significantly reducing the scope for public policy and government intervention, and by bringing under the sphere of the market other areas such as labor and the environment. This trend, present in NAFTA, is epitomized by the BFTA signed between the United States and Chile (2004). Both agreements have provided the structure and legal model for the majority of free trade agreements signed (or in the process of negotiation) by Latin American countries.
In these agreements, trade in goods is governed by the principle of non-discrimination and provides for the phasing out and elimination of tariffs between the signatory countries. While tariffs are for the most part programmed to be immediately eliminated, the text often contemplates their gradual phasing out for selected products over a specified period. Contrary to WTO legal texts, the services provisions require the granting of national and most favored nation treatment (i.e., non-discriminatory treatment) to service suppliers of contracting parties. The WTO General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) texts permits the imposition of 'discriminatory subsidies.' However, within the framework of the most perfected bilateral BFTA, these measures are not allowed once the agreement enters into force.
CEPAL -Serie Estudios y perspectivas -Mexico -N o 119 Trade and economic growth: A Latin American perspective… 24
The more recent bilateral agreements include an investment chapter. Its provisions are without doubt one of the most important pillars of the BFTAs 30 . It seeks to provide protection for foreign investors, or more specifically, 'a secure, predictable, legal framework for foreign investors.' This chapter is also one of the more controversial ones. First, the definition of investment is broad enough to cover tangible and intangible assets (property rights are considered an investment). Second, the investment chapter generally accords foreign investors national treatment and most-favored-nation treatment. Both national and most-favored nation provisions refer to the equality of treatment accorded to national and foreign investors in "like circumstances" 31 . The term 'like circumstances" is, however, broad and difficult to define and delimit.
Third, the level of generality of the investment chapter is enhanced by the call for minimum standards of treatment for foreign investors. The minimum standard of treatment means that investment should be treated according to the canons of customary international law. In turn, customary international law is defined as including 'fair and equitable treatment" and 'full security and protection" 32 . Fourth the investment chapter explicitly decouples investment flows from performance requirements (such as requirements that activity involve a given level or percentage of domestic content, or generate a certain level of foreign exchange earnings).
The most controversial provisions of the investment chapter are those related to the issues of expropriation and compensation. The free trade agreements prohibit the direct or indirect expropriation (or nationalization). Direct expropriation is a well defined term which refers to the nationalization, transfer of title or seizure of private property by the host government 33 . However, the term indirect expropriation (or nationalization) can be interpreted in different ways 34 . The legal texts mention the phrase "indirect expropriation by measures equivalent (or tantamount) to expropriation or nationalization" 35 . In order to determine whether an action constitutes "indirect expropriation" it needs to be assessed on a case-by-case basis. The evidence includes the economic impact of government action, the degree of interference of government action with investment-backed expectations 36 .
All BFTAs are similar in their structure and content, with some chapters having identical provisions. It can be easily argued that the negotiations are in fact a gradual piecemeal approach to a single BFTA with the rest of the world, whereby countries are added on a gradual basis. In this view, the bilateral agreements will eventually converge to an overall encompassing multilateral agreement, giving credence to the consequent improvement in welfare and growth hypothesized by free trade advocates. In short, the BFTAs represent the last step towards the outright liberalization of the movement of goods and services and the full implementation of free trade policies. They also imply the quasi complete abandonment of domestic policies to stimulate growth. See, Expropriation in International Law by Professor B.A. Wortley. Mimeo. July 1947. 34 In some court cases the term 'creeping expropriation' as a form of indirect expropriation is also utilized. Exceptions include cases where expropriation or nationalization are carried out, among other reasons, for a public purpose, in a nondiscriminatory manner, or in accordance with due process of law.
CEPAL -Serie Estudios y perspectivas -Mexico -N o 119
Trade and economic growth: A Latin American perspective… 25
The pattern of export development 1970-2006
Following the trade liberalization initiatives of the 1990s, Latin America did improve its export performance. The average annual rate of growth of exports of goods and services jumped from 4. 8% in 1970-1991 to 7.3% in 1992-2006 (see figure 2) . However, this dynamism of exports barely enhanced Latin America's participation in world trade.
As shown in Figure 3 below, Latin America increased, albeit modestly, its share in world exports of goods and services from 4.5% in 1990 to 5% in 2006. But its share in world trade in the post trade liberalization period (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) never managed to reach the levels attained during the pre-liberalization era (1960) (1961) (1962) (1963) (1964) (1965) (1966) (1967) (1968) (1969) (1970) . Moreover, the region has not improved its position in relation to other emerging economies in the East Asian bloc. It is worth noting that the economies of East Asia and the Pacific and Latin America had similar shares of world trade in the periods 1970-1980 and 1980-1990 (4.4% and 4 .6%, and 4.9% and 4.6% respectively). However, during 1990-2006 (the period of trade liberalization), East Asia and the Pacific augmented their share in world trade to 8%, surpassing that attained by Latin America (5%). 1970-1991 1992-2006 Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank (2008) .
FIGURE 2 EXPORTS AND IMPORTS OF GOODS AND SERVICES (ANNUAL AVERAGE RATES
Latin America's export performance can be better explained by examining the composition of its exports. To this end, we compute the composition of exports of Latin America by factor intensity and compare it to that of world imports. If the Latin American factor intensity composition of exports differs substantially from that of world imports, then Latin America's pattern of specialization does not meet the conditions of external demand. Table 9 below shows the exports of Latin America to the rest of the world classified, by factor intensity into five categories using the SITC classification for the period 1980-2006. The categories are: i) primary commodities, ii) labor intensive and resource-based manufactures; iii) manufactures with low skill and technology intensity; iv) manufactures with medium skill and technology intensity and v) manufactures with high skill and technology intensity. Table 9 shows a change in the composition of Latin American exports to the rest of the world, which has affected mainly primary commodities and manufactures with medium and high skill and technology intensity. Since 1980 the share of both manufactures with medium skill and technology intensity and manufactures with high skill and technology intensity has increased. Their respective export shares rose from 3.8% and 4.8% in 1980 to 25% and 20% of the total in 2006. During the same period the share of commodity exports declined from 79% to 37%. The shares of the two remaining categories, manufactures that are labor intensive and resource-based, and those with low skill and technology intensity have not changed significantly over time. But these changes in the composition of exports began prior to the trade liberalization period. As a result, trade liberalization per se did not produce any change with respect to the share of commodities in Latin America's export basket, but merely reinforced a previously existing trend. Furthermore, in spite of the decline in the commodity share of exports, the export structure remains predominantly commodity oriented. This characteristic is even more pronounced when the analysis is carried out at a more detailed and disaggregated level on a country-by-country basis. Table 10 shows the ten leading traditional Latin American export products on a country-by-country basis for 1995 and 2005, classified by major categories. The categories include food and agriculture, beverages, oils and seeds, raw materials, mining and energy. The ten major commodity exports accounted on average for 56% of the total for Latin America.
At the country level, the data reveals that a subset of countries (Paraguay, Uruguay, Panama and Nicaragua) is highly specialized in the export of traditional commodities and has strengthened its pattern of specialization over time. For this group of countries, the ten major leading commodities represented 64% and 71% of total exports of goods in 1991 and 2006.
The exceptions to this pattern of specialization are mainly Central American countries (Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras) which have markedly decreased their degree of specialization in primary commodities (from 54% to 29% of the total). With the exception of Costa Rica, Central American countries have switched to the export of textiles. At the country level in 1990 textile exports represented 22.8%, 24.0%, and 22.9% of the total exports to the United States for El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras, respectively. In 2006, textile exports represented 76%, 54%, and 68% for the same countries respectively (see table A-1 in the appendix).
Comparison of the composition of Latin America's exports to that of world imports shows that the region's specialization in manufactures with high skill and technological intensity and more importantly commodities is greater than that required by the rest of the world. In the case of commodities, the ratio of Latin America's share of commodities as a percentage of its total exports relative to the share of world commodity imports in total world imports is roughly 2.5% for the whole period. That is, Latin America's specialization in commodities exports is more than twice as great as that required by the composition of imports in the rest of the world.
Meanwhile, Latin America's export specialization in labor intensive and resource-based manufactures and manufactures with medium skill and technology intensity falls below that required by world imports. The ratio of Latin America's exports of labor intensive and resource-based manufactures and manufactures with medium skill and technology intensity to that of imports of these goods by the rest of the world is on average 0.5. In short, trade liberalization has not managed to change the composition of Latin America's exports to adequately meet the conditions of demand from the rest of the world. As a result the region has not been able to boost exports on a sufficient scale to gain world market share. In this sense it is important to note that, contrary to free trade rhetoric, increasing exports is not equivalent to changing their composition towards products with a higher value added, but means rather changing their composition to meet external demand. Latin America´s failure to adjust its export basket to world demand is reflected in the fact that the world income elasticity of demand for its exports is less than unity. Figure 4 below shows the income elasticity of demand for Latin American exports and the trend of the rate growth of world GDP. The export elasticity was computed from a standard export equation using space-state econometric techniques. That is, exports (in real terms) are posited as a function of the terms-of-trade and world real GDP per capita. The trend in real world GDP growth was obtained using the Hodrick-Prescott method. 70 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Figure 4 shows that the income elasticity of Latin America's exports somewhat follows the trend of world GDP growth. The correlation coefficient between both series is 0.92 for the whole period considered and is statistically significant. However, the trajectory of the moving elasticity coefficient indicates that its final value is equal to 0.63, and that the maximum and minimum values are 0.68 and 0.63 37 . Most important is the fact that the growth in exports of goods and services has not been able to keep pace with the rise in imports which accompanied trade liberalization. As indicated above, exports of goods and services expanded at a average annual rate of 4. 8% and 7.3% in 1970-1991 and 1992-2006 . But imports of goods and services expanded at rates of 4.6% and 9.4% respectively for the same periods. By construction the (mx1) vector of unobserved state variables t α follows a first order autoregressive process. The most widely used algorithm to estimate the parameters of Eqs. (2) and (3) where r is the simple correlation coefficient and n the number of observations. ρ follows a student-t distribution. In this particular case the computed t value is equal to 9.31 above the critical 1.64 at a 95% level of confidence. 
An analysis of the relationship between trade and growth 1970-2006
The current pattern of trade in Latin America has two major implications for economic growth. It has limited the potential for growth and has imparted volatility to the growth trajectory. As a result and as shown above, the export elasticity for Latin American products from the rest of the world is less than unity. That is, export growth in Latin America is not commensurate to the growth of demand in the rest of the world. Also, the negative trade balances that characterize the external positions of most Latin American countries imply that trade acts as a net-leakage from rather than an injection into the economy 38 . The balance-of-payments constrained nature of these economies is illustrated in Figure 6 . It shows that with the exception of the import substitution and recent commodity boom periods (1960-1970 and 2001-2006 respectively), Latin American economies have been forced to slow down growth in order to maintain their external balance 39 . The pattern of export specialization has also enhanced the volatility of Latin American growth. Indeed, the main export category, i.e. commodities, is acutely affected by not only foreign demand, but also the terms-of-trade. Ceteris paribus, the frequency and size of terms-of-trade fluctuations will affect the evolution of exports. Figure 7 below shows the evolution of the cyclical components of exports of 38 Within the non-mainstream literature this point has been made by Kalecki (1969) , Minsky (1986) , McCombie and Thirlwall (1984) . -periods 1960-1970, 1970-1980, 1980-1990, 1990-2000 and 2001-2006. The evidence shows that starting in 1980, the correlation coefficient between the cyclical components of the terms-of-trade and exports becomes significant and remains so throughout the trade liberalization period. For 1980 For -1990 More to the point, the correlation coefficient between the volatility of the terms-of-trade and that of exports is positive and statistically significant for all periods under consideration. Thus the greater and/or more frequent are fluctuations in the terms-of-trade (that is, the more volatile they are) the greater and more frequent will be fluctuations in exports. In turn, the cyclical component of exports is significantly associated with the cyclical component of Latin America per capita GDP, both in levels and growth rates. 15 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 The volatility imparted by terms-of-trade fluctuations on the growth trajectory of the Latin American economy is compounded by two factors. The first is financial volatility, which became prominent during the 1980's debt crisis and especially in the 1990's, due to the greater degree of financial openness of Latin American economies. The second is the policy reaction of Latin American governments and policy makers to real and financial volatility. 1 9 8 0 1 9 8 1 1 9 8 2 1 9 8 3 1 9 8 4 1 9 8 5 1 9 8 6 1 9 8 7 1 9 8 8 1 9 8 9 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 8 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0 At the same time the region experienced various episodes when capital inflows come to a sudden stop ('sudden capital stops') Recent empirical evidence shows that Latin American countries experienced 25 episodes of sudden capital stops in the 1990's -double that of the 1980's. In addition, the evidence indicates that the average magnitude of financial shocks rose from 0.7% of regional GDP in the 1980's to 3.5% of GDP in the 1990's. In other words, financial shocks not only became more frequent in the 1990's but also more significant relative to GDP.
FIGURE 6 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE BALANCE OF TRADE IN GOODS AND SERVICES (PERCENT OF GDP) AND THE RATE OF GROWTH OF PER
The response of Latin American governments to real and financial volatility (terms-of-trade and sudden capital stops) has been rather uniform. It consists of a contraction of internal demand as the main response to any significant terms-of-trade decline or sudden capital stop. Table 11 below shows that the average contraction in absorption due to both financial and terms-of-trade shocks for the period 1980-2006 was equivalent to roughly 10% of regional GDP. The terms-of-trade volatility and abrupt cessations in the inflow of foreign capital which have accompanied economic liberalization -together with the policy reactions that follow -have had important effects both on the trend and fluctuations of GDP growth in Latin America. In terms of its trend, GDP growth in the 1990s was on average half that registered in the protectionist cum ISI period. For 1960 For -1979 , the average rate of growth of Latin American GDP was 2.8%. This pattern also holds with few exceptions at the country level where 13 of 18 countries experienced lower rates of growth of GDP per capita in the 1990s than in . Meanwhile, evidence shows that the volatility of GDP growth -as measured by the coefficient of variation-increased in the 1990s. In 1960-1980, the coefficient of variation was 0.47, rising to 2.25 in the 1990s.
More precisely, during the 1990s Latin America witnessed more frequent periods of acceleration and deceleration in its growth of GDP per capita. In the period running from 1960 to 1980, it experienced an acceleration/deceleration in its rate of per capita GDP growth every four years. Thereafter, the region experienced such phenomenon every two years. Moreover, the amplitude of the GDP fluctuations became more pronounced during trade liberalization. The distance between peak and trough measured in percentage terms averaged 3.1% for the period 1960-1979, increasing to 3.4 % in 1991-2001 1960-2006 1960-1979 1980-1990 1991-2001 2002-2006 Rate of growth of actual GDP per capita (percentages) a The trend and cycle components of the rate of growth of GDP per capita was obtained through the use of the HodrickPrescott filter.
b The amplitude of the cycle was computed as the distance in percentage growth points between peak and through.
c Amplitude of cycle for the period 1995-2001. 40 Note also that GDP growth is more volatile in Latin America than in other regions of the world including East Asia and the Pacific, the Middle East and North Africa and South Asia.
Conclusions
In Latin America the dominant understanding of the relationship between trade and growth, and its accompanying rhetoric, has radically evolved over time.
Initially the relationship was conceived as one of managed trade to promote industrialization and growth. This view was based on the belief that development could not be attained unless a significant effort was made to accumulate capital. At the same time it presupposed that the existing 'automatic market forces' would keep the economic system entrenched in a low level of development. Industrialization was not to be left to the market, but was rather to be the product of government intervention.
As a result, the state was called on to take a leading role in the inward industrialization process. This inward industrialization approach originally developed in the period 1940-1960 and framed in terms of concepts, among others, such as 'center-periphery', 'dependency' and 'external strangulation' came to recognize the role of the external sector and of trade policies in promoting the domestic industrialization efforts. The concepts of 'infant industry,' 'managed trade' and 'special and differential treatment' took center stage.
By the 1980's, the debt crisis which caused the largest drop in output growth in the region's history and affected most of Latin American countries, was used as the leitmotif to launch a devastating critique of earlier developmental policies and to recommend policies based on the mantra 'stabilize, privatize and liberalize'. The pre-1980 policies were all labeled with the same rubric, Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) strategies. ISI policies were then, through different arguments particularly its rent-seeking character, placed at the roots of the economic evils of Latin America. Export outward oriented (EO) policies, responsible for the economic success of Asian countries according to the mainstream view, were then contra-posed to ISI policies. Free market beliefs and policies dominated the Latin American landscape during the 1990's and early 2000's.
Notwithstanding the implementation of free market policies, whose ultimate expression were bilateral free trade agreements, Latin America failed to overcome its external constraints, became highly vulnerable to the contagion effects of financial crisis, and became increasingly volatile. In short, a decade or more of free market policies did not lead Latin America to enter a path of high and sustained economic expansion. Moreover, the resumption of high rates of economic expansion in many countries of the region in the last five years has resulted mainly from the worldwide commodity and mineral boom -a boom whose cause and effects have nothing to do with the adoption of the trade liberalization reforms in the region.
The erosion of the Washington Consensus, reflecting the end of the region's fascination with free trade as an unequivocal and strong promoter of development, has led to a fifth stage in the understanding of the relationship between trade and growth. The characteristic feature of this stage is the skepticism that pure free market or state intervention policies will not by themselves ensure a sustainable growth path for Latin American economies. While there is a perceived need for a third way combining market and state intervention, the fifth stage has failed to produce clearly defined alternative viewpoints. This failure has been heightened by the unfolding of the global financial crisis which significantly limits, due to the strong expected contraction in external demand, Latin America, the role of trade as an engine of growth. 1960-1970 1971-1980 1981-1990 1991-2001 2002-2006 
